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WITHOUT PRIVILEGE*
STEVEN L. WINTER t
In footnote 74, just about halfway into their commentary,
Margaret Jane Radin and Frank Michelman quote Robert Cover's
caution that: "To live in a legal world requires that one know not
only the precepts, but also their connections to possible and
plausible states of affairs."' It is just here, I think, that the critique
of normative legal thought should begin. But, as pragmatists, Radin
and Michelman deploy Cover's statement in a significantly different
fashion. To them, it speaks of law's instrumental value and of how
well law fits in the circumstances. They would have us evaluate
rights discourse by asking how it works. If universalist rights
discourse has structural flaws, they suggest, it is a function of "its
working interface with surrounding cultural dispositions"2; it is a
consequence of "reflection's traffic with its contingent context, its
socio-cultural environment."3 What the pragmatist considers-and
it is just here that they. cite Cover-is whether "the discourse is
salvageable by work on those dispositions."4
Something quite similar occurs in the next paragraph. Some-
times, they explain, the problem with rights discourse is a matter of
"incomplete commitment to go all the way down the emancipatory
path that the discourse opens."5 Here, Radin and Michelman
graciously cite my own efforts to build on Cover's insights.6 Yet,
believing that I wrote something a little different, I am left wonder-
ing whether as pragmatists they haven't misread Cover, misread me,
and misread the critique of normative legal thought. And I wonder
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1 Cover, The Supreme Court; 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 4, 10 (1983).
2 Radin & Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1019, 1037 (1991).
3 Id. at 1037 n.73.
4 Id. at 1037 (citing Cover, supra note 1, at 10).
5 Id. at 1038.
6 Id. at 1038 n.77 (citing Winter, Transcendental Nonsens4 Metaphoric Reasoning, and
the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1232 (1989) ("Rights are about
the course of the future, and that future is made only through the commitments of
real people.")).
(1063)
1064 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:1063
whether it isn't a misreading that might have been avoided by closer
attention to Cover's caution.
Cover writes not about how (or whether) legal precepts work,
but rather what (and how) legal precepts mean. "The community
that writes law review articles has created a law-a law under which
officialdom may maintain its interpretation merely by suffering the
protest of the articles." 7 In contrast, he explains, "the act of civil
disobedience changes the meaning of the law articulated by
officialdom."8 It was this passage that I took up and elaborated.9
In this view, it is not discourse that paves the way for rights, but
committed action. 10 In Cover's own words: "Precepts must 'have
meaning,' but they necessarily borrow it from materials created by
social activity ... ."1 Part of that "material" is, of course, pro-
spective. Nevertheless, it is only in the context of that action that
the meaning of legal interpretation can be read:
The judicial word is a mandate for the deeds of others.... The
context of a judicial utterance is institutional behavior in which
others, occupying preexisting roles, can be expected to act, to
implement, or otherwise to respond in a specified way to the
judge's interpretation.... These interpretations, then, are not
only "practical," they are, themselves, practices.
12
7 Cover, supra note 1, at 47. This, we might say, is the original critique of
normative legal thought.8 Id. (emphasis added); see also Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601,
1606-07 (1986) ("[I]t is precisely this embedding of an understanding of political text
in institutional modes of action that distinguishes legal interpretation .... Legal
interpretation is either played out on the field of pain and death or it is something
less (or more) than law.").
9 See Winter, TranscendentalNonsense MetaphoricReasoning and the Cognitive Stakes
for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1231 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense] ("For us, the production and maintenance of legal meaning is dependent
upon lived human experience. To make meaning, one must do meaning....") For
further explanation of this point, see Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in
Constitutional Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1441, 1476-78, 1494-1500 (1990).
10 Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 9, at 1223-37.
11 Cover, supra note 1, at 18. For Cover, a nomos consists in "not only bodies of
rules or doctrine to be understood, but also worlds to be inhabited. To inhabit a
nomos is to know how to live in it." Id. at 6. Consequently, no system of thought can
truly be understood apart from its context: "History and literature cannot escape
their location in a normative universe, nor can prescription, even when embodied in
a legal text, escape its origin and its end in experience, in the narratives that are the
trajectories plotted upon material reality by our imaginations." Id. at 5 (footnotes
omitted).
12 Cover, supra note 8, at 1611; see also id. at 1613 (noting that "legal interpreta-
tion is as a practice incomplete without violence").
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All meaning is meaning in a context, and that meaning-conferring
context is the field of human action.
Radin and Michelman mistake the critique of normative legal
thought because they think of it as a critique of a certain kind of
thought that is identifiable by the properties it bears. Thus, they
chide: "We do not agree... that it is especially helpful.., to name
'normativity' as legal thought's crucially problematic characteristic
... ."13 But this is a reduction, and a surprising one for self-styled
pragmatists. 14 Normative legal thought is not the name of an
utterance that bears certain characteristics. It is the name of a
practice. To identify that practice as corresponding to its products
is to make the mistake of reification. 15 A practice is not a unitary,
static, or invariable "thing," but a dynamic pattern of performance.
But it is just this reduction and reification that Radin and
Michelman perform. "'We should talk more normatively' (WSTMN,
for short) is the name of a certain sentence-the one that says we
should talk more normatively." 16  For Pierre Schlag, however,
WSTMN is the name of a certain practice that takes place-and
therefore has meaning-only in the context in which it says. So
when Schlag contends-or, rather, is (mis)understood to contend-
that uttering WSTMN is contemptible as normative talk, he is not
engaged in argument and certainly not in normative legal argument.
Rather, he is engaged in an inquiry into the meaning and implica-
tions of normative talk when performed in the context of bureaucra-
tization, commodification, commercialization, consumer-orientation,
and social fragmentation in which we currently find ourselves.
"But," Radin and Michelman ask, "if this utterance of Schlag's
is not argument, then what is it?" 17 Perhaps it is satire; perhaps
it is deconstruction; perhaps it is merely reality testing. But it
certainly is not the "lapse of logic or consistency" that Radin and
Michelman simultaneously suggest and disclaim, 18 because this
13 Radin & Michelman, supra note 2, at 1020.
14 Cf id. at 1043 ("When we evaluate styles of argument in a pragmatist frame of
mind, we look for salient features in use .... " (emphasis added)).
15 See Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv.
963, 992-95 (1991).
16 Radin & Michelman, supra note 2, at 1021 (quoting Schlag, Normative and
Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167, 171 (1990)) (emphasis added by Radin and
Michelman).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1021-22. The question of "logic and consistency" is a red herring that
would have better been avoided altogether. Pragmatists/postmoderns like Radin and
Michelman surely recognize that logic is paradigm-dependent. What looks like "logic"
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"utterance of Schlag's" is not about what Radin and Michelman
seem to think. It is not about "legal scholarship's ... undeniable,
but seemingly inexpungible, trait of normaivity." 19 It is neither
about "traits" of discourse nor about a characteristic of utterances
called "normativity." It is, rather, about how we practice that
normativity and about the context of that practice.
If, as pragmatists, we were to reify the concept of "Normative
Legal Thought," it would make better sense to look in the other
direction and identify it with its animating conventions.20 That
focus, at least, would have the advantage of alerting us to the way
in which our intellectual productions are structured by the practices
and conventions in which we are situated-the very practices and
conventions that are the subject of the critique. That alternative
focus, moreover, might help us understand the capacity of norma-
tive legal thought to transform all thought in its own image.
What is that image? It is the image of the object-form, in which
everything is reduced to an object upon which the subject can act.
This reduction plagues 1Radin and Michelman throughout. It
appears in its most obvious and most symbolic form when they take
a sentence and reduce it to WSTMN, a meaningless object-like
entity. But the unconscious need for the object-form appears even
in their conception of practice. "To argue," they say, "is to invoke
the practice of argument, and that practice consists of normative
talk."2 1 It is as if argument were something--consisting in its
essential character of normative talk, no less-that could be invoked.
No, a real pragmatist might say, to argue is to engage in the practice
of argument, and the meaning of that practice consists in its
features in use. It can be normative (as when it attempts to
prescribe behavior) or rhetorical (as when it is engaged for its own
sake, as at a high school debate) or a power game (as when an
appointment, promotion, or curriculum change may alter one's
status on a faculty).
in one paradigm, may seem more like hypocrisy when viewed from the perspective
of another. Conversely, what looks like "contradiction" given one set of premises,
may be obvious entailment from within another. It is not, as Radin and Michelman
seem to suggest, that Schlag recognizes "the delicacy of his position" and is "attentive"
to it. Id. Rather, he is offering an understanding of these issues in which this
particular question of logic and consistency simply is not pertinent.
19 Id. at 1022.
20 Cf id. at 1047-48.
21 Id. at 1021.
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This image of the object-form is not an isolated conception, but
part of a rationalist schema that systematically plagues Radin and
Michelman's commentary. The object of thought entails a separate,
thinking subject, which in turn entails the need for a place to stand.
Subject/object/context is the organizing schema of their thought,
which is why they can speak of "reflection's traffic with its contingent
context, its socio-cultural environment."22  It animates their
concern with framework and stance, the question of "position."
"From where do you speak," they repeatedly ask, "and what
privileges your position?" 23 So too, Radin and Michelman claim
that: "When we are practicing pragmatically, we notice differences
in philosophical temperament, try to take them seriously, try to hold
them apart for long enough to ask what ramifications they have for
our lives." 24 To which, one might reply, there is no thing to take,
to hold apart, and no moment in which to do so. There are only
ways of seeing and being in the world, and never a safe and stable
space in which to stand and choose to mediate-even temporarily.
Which brings us directly to the questions of nihilism and
privilege. Nihilism, I would suggest, is the peculiar product of this
rationalist schema. When there is no secure place to stand, no
foundation free from dislodgement, no separation of subject-from-
object-from-context, then chaos seems obviously to threaten. And
by the same token, any particular scheme that carves these fast-
blurring categories into separate entities is necessarily a contingent
artifact that claims for itself a covert privilege. Thus, in what is
perhaps the most curious and peculiar moment in their paper, they
speculate whether they will "be charged with failing to privilege
poststructuralism."25 And they respond with the only answer
possible: There is no stance, no privilege, that is not vulnerable to
dislodgement.
26
The problem with this passage may be characterized in a
number of ways, but let me suggest two. First, it marks a failure of
what I would call empathy27 or what Radin and Michelman extol
as a "watchful receptiveness to redescription."28 Second, and con-
22 Id. at 1037 n.73 (emphasis added).
2 See Schlag, Stances, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1059 (1991).
24 Radin & Michelman, supra note 2, at 1043-44 (emphasis omitted).
25Id. at 1029.26 Id. at 1029-30.
27 See Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225, 2276-79 (1989).
28 Radin & Michelman, supra note 2, at 1051.
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versely, it manifests a kind of conceptual imperialism that pragma-
tists should most be on guard to avoid. For this question of
"privilege" is a pragmatist's question, one that makes little or no
sense within the redescription that they identify as "poststruc-
turalism."29  When, for example, they write that to accept the
contingency of all frameworks is to recognize that the deconstructi-
bility of any "no longer works as a foundational objection,"3 0 they
are, of course, correct. Except that they talk a talk which is simply
incommensurable with the understandings of their poststructuralist
discussant.
For the poststructuralist or phenomenologist, the question of a
foundation (however temporary) or position (however privileged) is
already a falsification, a misrepresentation, and a reification of our
condition. The problem is not that there are no foundations, but
that there are too many 31 There is no way to get outside of time
and existence, no way to escape the field of social interaction that
is the self and that the action of the self maintains, no way to
transcend-even for a moment-the constitutive action in which the
self is already situated and in which the self is always implicated. 2
Sometimes, we can relax the particular scheme by which we separate
subject-from-object-from-context long enough to attend to the ways
in which it constructs our world. But there is never a moment of
privilege because there is never a moment outside a process of
construction. What is possible-and all that is possible-are studied
acts of situated self-consciousness.
3 3
2 1 am not certain that this the best label for the style of redescription under
discussion; I would prefer the more generic "postmodernism." But, then, almost any
label will be equally problematic. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15 & 21. I
am, therefore, content to follow Radin and Michelman here-at least for the purposes
of this exchange.
So Id. at 1057.
31 Cf. Cover, supra note 1, at 16 ("It is the problem of the multiplicity of
meaning-the fact that never only one but always many worlds are created by the too
fertile forces of jurisgenesis-that leads at once to the imperial virtues and the
imperial mode of world maintenance.").
32 See Winter, supra note 15, at 987-91 (describing the ecological system in which
self, role, and community are mutually constitutive); see also Cover, supra note 1, at
5 ("This nomos is as much 'our world' as is the physical universe of mass, energy, and
momentum. Indeed, our apprehension of the structure of the normative world is no
less fundamental than our appreciation of the structure of the physical world.").
33 See Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 681-91
(1990). In these attempts, we take advantage of the fact that there is more than one
scheme, metaphor, or redescription. For an example, see id. at 682-84. This, too, is
an advantage of what Radin and Michelman call "epistemic pluralism." Radin &
Michelman, supra note 2, at 1042.
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Radin and Michelman acknowledge this constraint, but not its
implications. "[S]o the poststructuralist critic is limited to detailed
observation, from within a form of life, of practices embedded in
that form of life."8 4 But this necessarily means that there can be
no question of privileging poststructuralism. Rather, poststructura-
lism is a practice of deprivileging by redescription- 5 The post-
structuralist critique of normative legal thought is a matter of
redescribing and deprivileging the practice that assumes and
constitutes a sovereign self-our selves-in charge of its own
normative practices. If normativity seems everywhere and unavoid-
able, if there appears to be no utterance that is not normative, it is
because that is the practice, the convention, the institution, and the
form of life in which we participate and which we reproduce.
Radin and Michelman confess that: "Sometimes it is the
habitually most taken-for-granted cultural landscape features that
most cry out for redescription."36 It does not help to reify and
reduce that redescription, treating it as just another object-form to
be placed in the foreground for examination by a self. To the
contrary, this interpretive act merely reproduces the problem and
confirms the cogency of the critique. If Schlag's critique of
normativity produces this paradoxical substantiation, then the most
appropriate response may be that of George Bernard Shaw: "This
man is not challenging the fact of science; he is challenging the
action of science. Not only is he challenging the action of science,
but the action of science has surrendered to his challenge."
7
34 Radin & Michelman, supra note 2, at 1043. Since Radin and Michelman identify
this exercise with pragmatist critical practice, one can only wish that they had begun
their comment here.
35 Of which, the reversal of conceptual hierarchies is only the crudest, most
stubbornly logocentric form.
36 Radin & Michelman, supra note 2, at 1048. For an effort that takes this
observation so seriously that it implements it both literally and figuratively, see my
forthcoming article An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
(forthcoming 69 TEX. L. REV. (1991)) (discussing parks, Native American land claims,
and the countermajoritarian difficulty).3 7 Albert Einstein, Universe Maker, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1991, at A25, col. 4 (toast
by G.B. Shaw in honor of Albert Einstein).
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And, as for agency, well ... of course. It lies in that very
capacity for imagination and redescription, a capacity that is
contingent rather than originary.38 But, then, that makes it all
very complicated.3 9
38 By this I mean that, while the input does not determine the output, it does
shape and constrain the forms that output can take. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 27,
at 2244-55; see also Cover, supra note 1, at 9 ("These myths establish a repertoire of
moves-alexicon of normative action-that maybe combined into meaningful patterns
culled from the meaningful patterns of the past.").
39 See Winter, supra note 15, at 991-97; see also Radin & Michelman, supra note 2,
at 1041-43.
